Waiting for the Salafis

26.09.2014 Vatan
Translated by: Turgay BAYINDIR /
Orjinal Metin (tr-3/11/2014)

Sometimes a single sentence in one of your articles can attract more interest than many of your articles. I have received a lot of both positive and negative reactions for my observation at the end of the article yesterday that recent developments in our country have created favorable conditions for the “new Salafi” movement which, until now, has failed to take root in Turkey.

Readers’ reactions can be divided into three groups:
1.  Those who think that historically Turkey does not present suitable conditions for the Salafi and, regardless of the conditions, it would not take root in Turkey.
2.  Those who think that Salafism could be more effective compared to the past but secular-democratic Islam would still be the dominant ideology in Turkey.
3.  Those who fear that Salafism could reach such dimensions as to leave the other interpretations of Islam in its shadow.

It is a very old movement

I am closer to the third group. Before explaining why I think so, let us remember some important points about Salafism. “Salaf” means “the former one”. One of the oldest schools of Islam, Salafism takes the early Muslims as the ideal form of practicing Islam. Following the founding scholars such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ibn Taymiyyah, the school of faith that was initiated by Mohammad ibn Abdal-Wahhab known as Wahhabism is the most influential school of Salafism in our day.

Our real subject, the “new Salafism” has been mostly inspired by Wahhabism; it is a transnational movement that is supported and sometimes financed by the official Wahhabi organizations in the Gulf countries. We saw the first remarkable example of the new Salafism in Afghanistan with the Taliban. Then, Taliban’s close ally al-Qaeda made the “new Salafi” movement famous globally. Both the influence of such organizations (as the Taliban and al-Queda) and the sponsorship of the regimes in power in the Gulf, new Salafi groups started to emerge one after another especially in Arab countries.

Individual anger instead of social objection
   
Based on the examples of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it should not be assumed that the new Salafism is a movement based solely on violence. Even though it attracts a lot of young people who die and kill without much hesitation, there are a lot of new Salafi groups and parties whose activities are legally sanctioned. A famous example to this is the al-Nour Party in Egypt was able to support the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood.

The new Salafi movement is able to meet the needs of the young generation searching for sincerity and puritanism as a reaction to both the political system in place and the traditional religious institutions. Contrary to what might be expected, the real dynamism of the new Salafi movement is provided by the young people of middle class background and a certain level of education. They put the idea of a congregation as in the days of Prophet Mohammad in opposition to the extremely hierarchical structures seen in traditional religious groups. One of the qualities that separates the new Salafis from others is that commanders die as often as regular soldiers in war.

The opportunity Turkey is missing

It is said that in Turkey where religious orders such as Naqshbandis and Qadiris, and schools such as “Süleymancı” or “Nurcu” sects are strong and where there is a strong tradition of obedience to the State, the new Salafi movement cannot go beyond a  marginal existence. The relatively minor activity of Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda is generally put forward to support this claim. It is true; yet, we also know that many Turkish citizens have been fighting for decades in jihad lands such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq and Syria, and that some of them have adopted the new Salafi teachings over time. Even if some of them decided to return to Turkey we might be facing a strong wave of Salafi movement. Would they return? It is possible if for this or that reason AKP government lost power and Turkey started to be regarded as a “jihad land”.

Children of the religious middle class

However the stronghold of the new Salafis in Turkey would be the children of the new conservative middle class who have acquired a lot of power since they have been taking full advantage of what the regime has to offer since AKP came to power. The AKP government has offered abundant financial opportunities to this class while leaving them spiritually hungry for the most part. The fact that the patriarchal mentality that is dominant in AKP has left the mothers of these young people in disadvantaged positions is primarily responsible for the anger that these young people have accumulated.
 
Another point is the fact that Prime Minister Erdoğan has to a large extent wasted the opportunity to improve and strengthen democracy in a country where Muslims constitute the overwhelming majority, and thus become an example to the Muslims of the world. When pluralism is replaced by majoritarianism, it is impossible for the culture of democracy to flourish. Lastly, even though the socialist interpretations of Islamic ideologies have become prominent in recent years, especially with the Gezi resistance, both the lack of experience of its followers and the overall weakness of leftist movements in Turkey has prevented it from becoming a viable alternative to Salafism even though it offers great prospects.

I will stop the discussion of this crucial issue at this point and continue tomorrow together with the critical reaction I receive from you. 

Destek olmak ister misiniz?
Doğru haber, özgün ve özgür yorum ihtiyacı
Bugün dünyada gazeteciler birer aktivist olmaya zorlanıyor. Bu durum, kutuplaşmanın alabildiğine keskin olduğu Türkiye'de daha fazla karşımıza çıkıyor. Halbuki gazeteci, elinden geldiğince, doğru haber ile özgün ve özgür yorumla toplumun tüm kesimlerine ulaşmaya çalışmalı ve bu yolla, kutuplaşmayı artırma değil azaltmayı kendine hedef edinmeli. Devamı için

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