Military aid to Kobane in 5 questions

24.10.2014 Habertürk
Translated by: Turgay BAYINDIR /
Orjinal Metin (tr-10/21/2014)

1.  Why did the aid arrive late?

First of all, it was assumed that IS(IS) would capture Kobane easily and the aid would not be of any use. That is, the expectation that “Kobane will fall any minute” was shared by many not only in Ankara but in Washington DC as well. Secondly, Ankara strongly objected to giving military aid, especially in the form of heavy artillery to PYD and its military unit YPG, underlining the possibility that these might be handed over to PKK members in Turkey. Turkey also urged its allies, particularly the USA to remain distant to Kobane.
 
2.  Why now?

First of all, despite the unequal distribution of arms, which can be summarized as “tanks vs. Kalashnikovs”, Kobane did not fall. Upon this, the international coalition first carried out stronger and more effective bombardment of IS(IS) targets. Due to the effectiveness of air strikes that were carried out in coordination with YPG, the idea of defeating IS(IS) emerged as a possibility and this brought the reinforcement of arms, ammunition and warriors on the agenda.
 
3.  Who plays the key role in the aid?

Because direct military aid to PYD/YPG, which has ideological, political and even organizational ties with PKK, would cause problems both for Ankara and for Washington DC, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) came into play for the aid. The relations between Arbil and Qandil had already started to improve during the cooperation in the fight against IS(IS) in places like Sinjar, Makhmour and Kirkuk. Therefore, the aid to Kobane can also be seen as a sign of appreciation by KRG. In addition, we can expect that PYD will include people and institutions that are close to Masoud Barzani within the Kurdish government in Rojava (Syria).
 
4.  How was Ankara convinced?

The AKP government followed the wrong strategy regarding Kobane from the very beginning. So much so that it led to speculations both in Turkey and abroad that Ankara desired the fall of Kobane. It appears that, in addition to the emergence of an increased possibility of victory for Kobane, what was important in changing this strategy was the possibility of the recurrence of street clashes in Turkey, which would risk the resolution process.
 
5.  What will happen now?

It does not look like Kobane will fall easily now. This experience will probably strengthen the international coalition’s hand against IS(IS) in Syria and Iraq. Also, directly or indirectly, the fact that there has been been a cooperation with PKK will of course change the power dynamics in the region and in Turkey. If the government devices intelligent strategies from now on, the fact that Kobane did not fall could help Turkey to resolve the Kurdish question and to play a more active role in the region. 




Destek olmak ister misiniz?
Doğru haber, özgün ve özgür yorum ihtiyacı
Bugün dünyada gazeteciler birer aktivist olmaya zorlanıyor. Bu durum, kutuplaşmanın alabildiğine keskin olduğu Türkiye'de daha fazla karşımıza çıkıyor. Halbuki gazeteci, elinden geldiğince, doğru haber ile özgün ve özgür yorumla toplumun tüm kesimlerine ulaşmaya çalışmalı ve bu yolla, kutuplaşmayı artırma değil azaltmayı kendine hedef edinmeli. Devamı için

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